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South Florida's long and sordid history of shoddy building practices is hard to ignore in the wake of the Surfside building collapse.
We don't know yet what caused the horrific failure on June 24 at the Champlain Towers South Condo.
We are not suggesting that any corners were cut during construction, or that insufficient inspections or overdue maintenance played roles. It's possible that climate change, nearby construction or reported "major structural damage" caused by improper pool-deck drainage affected the integrity of the building.
We are holding our elected officials accountable for a thorough, honest and urgent investigation into the causes of this still-unfolding tragedy.
But we do know a lot about the way construction was done in South Florida in 1981, when this condo was erected.
Condominium construction was red-hot then, fueled in part by what would turn out to be a disastrous deregulation of the nation's savings and loans associations. Building codes for single-family homes during that era were weak, and enforcement was lax, something that became terribly apparent when Hurricane Andrew roared through southern Miami-Dade County.
Residents of condos across Florida and beyond are watching developments here with anxiety about their own safety. The ramifications of what happened in Surfside likely are to be enormous.
Now, even as search teams continue to recover the bodies of victims -- and pray for signs of life in the horrific, pancaked wreckage -- authorities and journalists have been looking for any warning signs. The most significant, so far, seems to be an engineer's report in 2018 that raised red flags, saying concrete slabs on the garage entrance and under the pool deck had deteriorated, and that lack of proper drainage had caused "major structural damage."
The report didn't indicate a threat of imminent disaster, and a month later, Surfside's chief building official told residents the condominium was "in very good shape," according to minutes from a November 2018 board meeting. Additionally, the building had begun its scheduled 40-year review and roof repairs had started.
Mass tragedies like this one often lead to serious changes in regulations, like those after Hurricane Andrew. If we learn that this condominium collapse could have been prevented with new and better building codes, more frequent inspections or tougher requirements for condo maintenance or construction, this disaster must serve as yet another turning point in building safety in Florida.
That will cost money, a lot of it. Retrofitting old buildings and constructing new ones to higher standards costs more. But if cost-cutting is what led to this disaster, we'll have no choice. We'll need to pay up, and just be grateful that we're around to pay the bill.
* Guest editorial by The Miami Herald.